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Austrian Refugee Social Scientists 
Christian Fleck 
One of the frequently reproduced photographs of Sigmund Freud shows him looking 
out of a train‟s window, obviously to say goodbye to someone on the platform. Very 
often this photo has been used without explaining the circumstances of its shooting. 
The train was taking Freud into exile early in June of 1938, and his departure 
encouraged at least one photographer to document it for future usage. The majority of 
those forced to leave their country of origin at the same time, however, went abroad 
without leaving similar traces not only because they were less prominent than the 
founder of psychoanalysis but also because they had to flee secretly, hiding themselves 
in a mass, or using paths where picture taking was not recommended. Our historical 
knowledge about the fate of Nazi refugee intellectuals was for a very long time similar 
to the photographic documentation of Freud‟s going into exile, incomplete: We knew 
that some very prominent figures had to leave Austria around the Anschluss, but we 
did not know the details and, at least for the first half century after the tragedy, we 
lacked a comprehensive picture of this mass exodus. Serious research only started 
during the last quarter of a century but much uncharted territory remains. This paper 
presents an overview on one sub-group of the Nazi refugees, those whom we 
recognize today as social scientists whose roots can be traced back to Austria, and to 
Vienna in particular. In so doing, I aim to portray the characteristics of the entire 
cohort of refugees at least with regard to some of their characteristics rather than to 
concentrate on the prominent figures. Thus I hope to identify the social conditions, 
constraints and opportunity structures they faced at three levels, from the macro-level 
of social structure via middle-level of organizations and occupations down to 
differences at the individual level. Thus when individuals are named they are only 
intended as illustrative examples and as a way of assisting readers to relate my 
sociological analysis to the more historical accounts. 
1. 
At the outset it is necessary to recognize the complexity of such an analysis. The first 
difficulty is connected to the distinction between the „stars‟ and more ordinary folk; 
for obvious reasons there is much more data on the first than on the second group. 
Secondly, as in 1933 when some Austrians living in Germany became victims of the 
Nazi purge against Jews and political opponents, not all individuals fleeing from 
Austria around 1938 were Austrians, either by residence or citizenship. To complicate 
the case further émigré Austrians were taken as Germans by some of their hosts 
abroad, and several historians have followed suit. In some respects, it is true, 
distinguishing between Austrians and Germans may be irrelevant, but from a 
sociological point of view the different political and social contexts in Germany and 
Austria were substantial.  
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A third issue stems from one of these contextual particularities: even before the 
Anschluss in March 1938, Austria had already been political a dictatorship, in which 
political opponents were victimized, persecuted, and forced into exile. The exiles 
included scholars and others who became prominent in the social sciences later on. 
Moreover, Austria‟s labor market for educated people had been shrinking since 1931 
when, after the collapse of the Austrian bank, Credit-Anstalt, the conservative 
government adopted an austerity policy that resulted in dismissals of civil servants, 
university professors and faculty. The repression of the authoritarian regime in Austria 
is not comparable with what happened in Nazi-Germany or in Austria after the 
Anschluss, but the cultural climate was nevertheless unpromising and the mood was 
dark. As a consequence many people, especially young university graduates, were 
contemplating migration, mostly for professional reasons, but also for political ones. 
Some of those regarded today as refugees went abroad to find work, while some only 
learned during their search for a job that the institutions they approached were not 
ordinary labor market agencies but refugee assistance organizations, such as the 
Academic Assistance Council (A.A.C.)/ SPSL. The widely used Biographisches 
Handbuch der deutschsprachigen Emigration nach 1933/ International Biographical 
Dictionary of Central European Emigrés 1933–19451 lists several of these job- 
seekers or ordinary academic migrants: thus, to mention the most telling instances, 
Friedrich A. Hayek and Joseph A. Schumpeter both accepted offers from universities 
in London and Cambridge, Massachusetts before 1933, when the Nazis took power.  
Besides the political realities in the 1930s, other issues also deserve recognition if the 
focus of the analysis is on the development of the social sciences during the second 
third of the twentieth century. One in particular brings us to the core of the present 
paper. Quite simply, the social sciences as we know them today did not exist in 
Austria during the 1920s and 1930s. University curricula did not include sociology or 
political science, while economics and psychology were part of the traditional 
disciplines of law and philosophy respectively. Research sites outside the university 
system were rare, and in most cases could not offer a regular income. 
  
Finally an account of the refugee scholars should be accompanied by an examination 
of those whom one could call “homeguards”2, meaning all those who remained in Nazi 
Germany for a variety of reasons, not all out of their tacit support for or even 
affiliation to the Nazi-movement. Some, for example, delayed their decision to flee 
                                                          
1 Werner Röder and Herbert A. Strauss (eds.), Biographisches Handbuch der deutschsprachigen Emigration nach 1933 (= International 
Biographical Dictionary of Central European Emigrés 1933–1945), 3 vol., München: Saur 1980–1983. 
2
 I have adopted this term from the Chicago sociologist Everett Ch. Hughes, who used this term in a review of Lazarsfeld & 
Thielens, Academic Mind , `to distinguish the people of small, particular orbits from those of larger identifications and 
connections’; he calls the latter `itinerants’ . See Hughes, Everett C.,` The Academic Mind” Two Views,’ in: American Sociological 
Review 24, (4)1959 p. 572. 
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until it was too late, or lacked the means for a successful escape and ended up in 
concentration camps. The number of social scientists who became victims of the 
Holocaust is surprising small, but even this small number reveals some of the 
distinctiveness of the impact of the Nazis on the social sciences. Thus, we should 
remember that while some of those who later on became prominent figures in the 
social sciences narrowly escaped their pursuers, it is equally probable that others who 
might have become eminent were caught by the Gestapo when they were students or 
young graduates lacking the high profile which might have helped them escape the 
Nazi extermination camps. 
2. 
A first step in analyzing refugee scholars as a group has to take account of their social 
roots, and, in comparing the Austrians and Germans, the different composition of the 
populations from which they were drawn. This has two aspects: on the one hand, the 
size of the Jewish population in the two areas, and on the other the size of the 
Bildungsbürgertum, or educated people. The two societies differed in both, but 
whereas it is relatively easy to compare the number of Jews in Austria and Germany, it 
is more difficult to estimate their Bildungsbürgertum. While the census data on Jews 
only indicate what can be labeled the core of the potential victims of the Nazi regime, 
there is no reason to assume that the difference between the Jewish population and the 
larger number of the targets of the racist Nuremberg Laws varied in Germany and 
Austria. Culturally both societies showed the same patterns of intermarriage and 
conversion, and it is fair to take the number of Jews reported in the censuses as a valid 
for purposes of comparison. In Germany, about 1 per cent of the population was of 
Jewish whereas nearly 10 per cent of the Viennese were Jews. However, nine out of 
ten Austrians Jews lived in the capital city, so the figures are proportionately roughly 
comparable. 
Identifying the size of the Bildungsbürgertum is more complicated since we do not 
have a list of all people belonging to the population of which the refugee scholars are a 
subset. We therefore have to use crude estimates to specify the proportions. Official 
statistics, like census data, do not provide what a sociologist wants to get in detail, but 
approximations are feasible. Table 1 gives the data for those professions which formed 
the core of the educated classes in Germany in the 1930s. Table 2 offers data for only 
three occupational groups for Austria, but shows in addition their decline between the 
census of 1934 and the census of 1939.
3
 The composition of the Bildungsbürgertum in 
the Weimar Republic and Austria‟s First Republic is striking in itself. Given that 
Germany‟s total population outnumbered the total in Austria by 10:1 (table 3), the size 
                                                          
3 The Nazi regime arranged for 1939 a census also in the then incorporated Austria. Hughes analyzed the official German 
handling of census data with regard to the Jewish population’s decline in his seminal paper “The Gleichschaltung of the German 
Statistical Yearbook”, reprinted in: Hughes, Everett Ch., On Work, Race, and the Sociological Imagination, ed. Lewis A. Coser, Chicago: 
The University of Chicago Press 1994, 200-207 (originally 1955). 
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of the German Bildungsbürgertum seems to be much smaller than its Austrian 
counterpart. The German social historian Hans Ulrich Wehler
4
 estimates the German 
Bildungsbürgertum as 0.2 per cent of the overall population, but the data in table 2 
indicate that the Austrian Bildungsbürgertum may have been double the size of its 
German counterpart. This is astonishing first because in the German case Protestant 
clergymen counted for one in four of the educated class, whereas Protestant clergymen 
(and their families) did not play any significant role in Austria, while Catholic priests, 
despite their influence in Austria‟s politics and cultural life, are not present in these 
data. The three so called free occupations of doctors, lawyers and writers-journalists 
(professional occupations in American sociological vernacular) alone represent a share 
of the Austrian population similar in size to the entire educated class in Germany.  
If we bear in mind that the population of Jews was proportionately larger in Vienna 
than in Germany, and consider that the Bildungsbürgertum was in particular prone to 
over- represent Jews, one has to conclude that the numbers of potential Jewish victims 
was larger in Vienna than in Germany. Historically there are a couple of reasons for 
these disproportions in two otherwise similar societies. On the one hand the Austrian 
Republic was the heir of the much larger Habsburg Empire and inherited the more 
educated strata of the old Empire‟s population, most of who lived in the imperial 
metropolis, Vienna, and inclined towards German culture. On the other hand, during 
the last decade of the old Empire and the early years of the Republic, Vienna received 
many more Jewish immigrants from the Eastern Europe than Germany did. Like the 
educated class, and in particular the civil servants, Jewish immigrants were 
concentrated in Vienna, and this fueled anti-Semitism in the city. Austrian anti-
Semitism was at least partly rooted in conflicts over resources, particularly 
employment. To call it group conflict does not minimize the racism of its proponents 
but points towards the social mechanism triggering such conflicts. If there are real 
things as jobs at stake prejudices are much more easily roused than if divergent groups 
live side by side without interfering each other. 
One of the most prominent consequences of the anti-Semitism of Vienna‟s petty 
bourgeoisie was the ban on Jews entering the ranks of civil servants, which included 
university professors at this time. During the declining years of the Habsburg Empire 
but also during the early years of the Republic – and we should remember that the 
Social Democrats regarded the transition to democracy a revolution, and even had 
some influence over the hiring policies of the universities in the early 1920s – Jews 
who abandoned their faith and converted to Christianity could get entry to particular 
jobs, professorship included. Discrimination and exclusion of Jewish students, 
graduates, and also Privatdozenten were still severe, but some individuals could enter 
university faculties. From the mid-1920s onwards, the rise of the extremist right 
                                                          
4 Wehler, Hans Ulrich, Deutsche Gesellschaftsgeschichte. Bd. 4: Vom Beginn des Ersten Weltkriegs bis zur Gründung der beiden deutschen Staaten 
1914-1949, München: C.H. Beck 2003, 726f. 
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affected the hiring policies of the University of Vienna, but it is also true that from 
then on few positions were opened up and far fewer professorships were replaced. 
Paradoxically, the more anti-Semitism increased, the less discrimination was needed, 
for sheer lack of opportunities. As we have already noted, Jews were concentrated 
both regionally and in the Bildungsbürgertum in Austria. Jews lived overwhelmingly 
in Vienna, and the same is true for the social strata in which Jews were 
overrepresented.
5
 It may therefore be historically appropriate to say that the more 
virulent anti-Semitism in Vienna reported by eye witnesses was very often the 
unintended consequence of the higher density of Jews there. This is not an excuse for 
the behavior of the Viennese, but does provide some explanation for its occurrence. 
Given this rough comparison between the Bildungsbürgertum in Germany and Austria, 
it is not surprising that all the historical sources and accounts of refugee scholars 
record a disproportionally large group of former Austrians. 
3. 
Given all these considerations, it is still puzzling that the proportion of professors 
dismissed was higher in Austria around 1938 than it was in Germany around 1933 (see 
table 3).
6
 Either there were more potential victims around in Austria, or Nazis in the 
University of Vienna, where most of the dismissals took place, acted more vigorously. 
The data in table 4 support the first view. The higher proportion of dismissals in the 
higher ranks (of ordentliche and außerordentliche Professor) supports such an 
interpretation by showing that in these two groups of regularly employed professors 
the number of those close to the political regime of the Ständestaat was higher. The 
former regime had dismissed some of the most ardent Nazis, and the Ministry of 
Education had a strong influence in the selection process of professors. Both 
mechanisms contributed to an overrepresentation of men close to the ruling 
Conservatives. After the Anschluss nearly all who had some connections to the 
authoritarian government or the Catholic Church lost their jobs, but they seldom 
emigrated because they received official retirement pensions and for the most part 
were not of Jewish origin. This interpretation is further sustained by looking at the 
number of dismissed Dozenten, that is persons who were permitted to teach at the 
universities but no regular employment or salary from the university (they received 
small fees from his students). In addition to the fact that only Dozenten could ascend to 
the professoriate, the barrier for outsiders and nonconformists was lower so that more 
Jews could be found there. Since the proportion of dismissed Austrian Dozenten was 
the same as those reported dismissed by German universities, it seems that more 
opponents of the Nazis were persecuted in the higher ranks. 
                                                          
5 One can see this by looking at the shrinking of the free professions in Austria between 1934 and 1939 which happened primarily 
in Vienna but not in the provinces. 
6 All estimations with regard to numbers of dismissed people are problematic. To minimize biases I used here very similar sources 
for the comparison; comp. table 4 for ranges of estimates. 
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About 400 faculty members lost their jobs in Austrian universities as a consequence of 
the Anschluss. The exact numbers of Jews in the broad meaning of the racial laws are 
unknown but traditionally there have been few Jews at the universities of Graz and 
Innsbruck. One can therefore estimate that the different dismissal rates between 
Vienna and the other Austrian universities are a fair approximation for the number of 
Jewish victims. The far higher dismissal rates in Vienna reflect the higher proportion 
of Jews in the faculty there. Social scientists, broadly defined, were a tiny minority 
within this group because, as mentioned before, the social sciences played only a 
marginal role in Austrian universities. 
To estimate the approximate numbers of refugee social scientists one has to go the 
other way, with all its shortcomings. In previous research, I tried to sample German 
speakers in the social sciences between the mid-1920s and the mid-1950s as rigorously 
as possible. This list included anyone who published at least two reviews in any of the 
contemporary social science journals, all scholars listed in biographical dictionaries 
and encyclopedias, and all who received fellowships from the Rockefeller Foundation 
and had lived for some years in Austria or Germany were included.
7
 The sample 
consists of 823 social scientists. Of these, 29 per cent lived in Austria, another 9 per 
cent lived in both Germany and Austria) and only 7 per cent were female. 58 per cent 
had emigrated at some time between 1920 and 1955. The 58 per cent includes both 
people who left their country of origin before the rise of Nazism or after the end of the 
Third Reich, but the vast majority left Central Europe during the years when the Nazis 
were in power.
8
 We can therefore consider them as the social sciences refugee 
population, with special emphasis on sociologists and political scientists, and an 
unsystematic sampling of economists, historians, social philosophers, statisticians, 
psychologists, and pedagogues, etc.
9
 
Comparing Germany with Austria also makes it possible to calculate different rates of 
emigration for the social sciences: over the whole period, 72 per cent of the Austrian 
social scientists, and 68 per cent of those with dual citizenship emigrated, but only 49 
per cent of the German social scientists left. The median age of the refugees at the time 
of their escape was 35 years for social scientists from Austria, 38 years for the 
Germans and 42 years for the double citizens. While on average both Austrian and the 
German refugee cohorts received their doctorates about ten years before they went into 
exile, the double citizens graduated seventeen years before they left. Those who took a 
                                                          
7
 See for details: Fleck, Christian, Transatlantische Bereicherungen. Zur Erfindung empirischer Sozialforschung, Frankfurt: Suhrkamp 2007, 
chapter 4. 
8
 From the 347 social scientists 97 per cent of the German refugees left Germany between 1932 and 1940; 27 per cent of the 
Austrians left between 1933 and 1937 and additional 65 per cent left in 1938 and the following years. 
9 The aim of the study was on the history of sociology but since sociology did not exist at this time, a wider net had to be used to 
end up with a satisfying sample. In addition the disciplinary identity was not as strong as in later decades. 
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Habilitation with them into exile went through this rite de passage almost immediately 
before they left, at the age of 34.
10
 
Before illustrating the intellectual milieu of the refugee scholars we should remember 
that most of those who became social scientists after their escape were earning their 
living by working in different occupations, sometimes obscure ones, before they left 
central Europe, as some of the better documented cases show. Thus, Hans Zeisel, 
collaborator in the now famous study of the unemployed, Marienthal, worked as a 
lawyer and sports reporter for the Viennese daily Arbeiter Zeitung; Alexander 
Gerschenkron, who was born in Odessa and came as a adolescent to Vienna around 
1920, finished his university studies some time in the 1930s and seems to have earned 
money by playing chess in coffeehouses; Edgar Zilsel taught in a gymnasium after he 
was fired by the Ständestaat from his post as a teacher at the Volkshochschule; Bruno 
Bettelheim who submitted his dissertation after fourteen years studying philosophy in 
Vienna just weeks before the Anschluss, earned his living as a manager in his father‟s 
firm; Karl Popper held a minor job as a teacher at an elementary school; Gustav 
Ichheiser lost his job as an occupational psychologist in the Vienna municipality 
around 1934, and over the following years commuted between his native Poland and 
Austria; and Karl Polanyi worked as a member of the Viennese weekly Der 
österreichische Volkswirt until his employment ended when his editor, Gustav Stolper, 
could no longer support him.  
To put the same story in another perspective: in the mid 1950s, when some one 
hundred former Austrians held teaching positions in sociology at U.S. higher 
education institutions there was only one professor of sociology in Austria. 
Counterfactually, if the Nazis had not achieved power, it is at least arguable that 90 per 
cent or more of those who had become sociologists would have had to choose different 
occupational paths back in Austria. 
Historians and others very often refer to circles, discussion groups, schools, and 
similar micro-environments when they portrait Austria‟s intellectual history. Some of 
these groups were destroyed completely during the late 1930s, others lost most of their 
members. Practically all Freudians and their rivals from other schools of psycho-
analysis, such as the followers of Alfred Adler, went into exile during the 1930s. The 
university-based psychologists, Karl and Charlotte Bühler, formed another grouping to 
which some later on prominent social scientists belonged. One such was Else Frenkel-
Brunswik, who collaborated with the exiled Frankfurt School in their study of the 
Authoritarian Personality and Ernest Dichter, who reinvented himself as the “father of 
motivational research” after his emigration to the United States. Closely connected 
with the Bühlers was the group led by Paul F. Lazarsfeld who founded the 
                                                          
10
 At this time the number of years between graduation and Habilitation, meaning becoming a Dozent with the right to teach at 
the university, was much lower than later. 
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Wirtschaftspsychologische Forschungsstelle in 1931, which produced a seminal study 
on the socio-psychological consequences of unemployment, Marienthal: The 
Sociography of an Unemployed Community (1933). His collaborators in this and 
subsequent studies were, besides Hans Zeisel mentioned above, Lazarsfeld‟s first and 
second wives, Marie Jahoda and Hertha Herzog. Another bridge connected this group 
of young social researchers with the Austro-Marxists, who formed one of the 
intellectually richest circles in interwar Vienna. Indeed Jahoda lost her Austrian 
citizenship as a consequence of her political activities in the underground resistance 
movement of the Revolutionary Socialists against the Ständestaat in 1937 and was 
forced to leave Vienna the day after a six-month jail sentence. She went to London and 
lived there through the war years. 
The Social Democratic movement provided a fertile environment for other scholarly 
endeavors as well. The group of philosophers forming the Vienna Circle of Logical 
Positivism had a left wing, to which Otto Neurath, Rudolf Carnap, Edgar Zilsel, 
Gustav Bergmann, Herbert Feigl, and Philipp Frank belonged. Although he was never 
a loyal opponent of neo-positivism, Karl R. Popper was nevertheless part of the same 
socio-political context. Nearly all the members of the Vienna Circle went into exile, 
most ending up finally in the U.S., although Neurath came to England after four years 
in the Netherlands. After going into exile, these left wing neo-positivists contributed to 
the debate on the methodology of the social sciences, and strengthened the inclination 
of social scientists to adopt the success model of the sciences.  
Felix Kaufmann who participated in the debates of the neo-positivists was at the same 
time a close collaborator of Alfred Schütz who, after his migration to New York, 
became famous as a phenomenological sociologist at the New School for Social 
Research where both Kaufmann and Schütz finally became professors. In Vienna, 
Schütz had worked as a banker, and Kaufmann as a manager of an oil company; both 
were part of another famous group of thinkers, Ludwig Mises‟ Privatseminar and the 
adjuncted Geist-Kreis. Mises earned his living as a leading officer of the Viennese 
Chamber of Commerce, and taught as a Privatdozent economics at the University of 
Vienna. Because of his Jewish origin he could not get a regular professorship, but he 
assembled a group of younger economists around himself which met once a week in 
his office for discussions. Almost the entire third and fourth generation of the Austrian 
School of Economics migrated but not for reasons of racist victimization. Only few 
were of Jewish origin – Mises, Fritz Machlup, and Abraham Wald – the majority was 
Gentile but against Nazism. The Austrian School‟s reputation made it easy for its 
followers to find places abroad. Friedrich A. Hayek was the first to attain a post at the 
LSE in 1931, Machlup moved to Buffalo in 1935 and Gottfried Haberler to Harvard in 
1936, while Oskar Morgenstern remained in Princeton where he was on a lecture tour 
during the Anschluss. Political science did not exist as a formal discipline in Austria at 
that time but people who later held professorships in political science were around: 
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Eric Voegelin, Erich Hula and, the most prominent, Hans Kelsen, who left Vienna for 
Cologne in 1930. After his dismissal from Cologne in 1933, Kelsen spent time in 
Geneva and Prague before escaping to the U.S. just before the war. 
Catholics did not play a major role in the evolving social sciences but some of those 
who were dismissed went into exile: Johannes Messner, Ernst Karl Winter, and Johann 
Mokre. Very few scholars of history, especially art history, ethnology, and some parts 
of law, international and constitutional law in particular, emigrated: the exceptions 
who were later to become well-known were the art historians Ernst Gombrich and 
Hans Tietze; the Arabist Gustav E. Grünebaum; the social anthropologist S. F. Nadel; 
and William Ebenstein who became a political scientist.  
As one can see from this short overview, most of the intellectually fertile groups were 
only loosely connected with the formal university system; most were sidelined or even 
excluded from academia. It does not come as a surprise therefore that all political 
leftists were only able to finish their university studies but had to look for other 
sources of income later on. In a shrinking system of higher education, with no new 
jobs and few replacements, outsiders did not have much chance. 
As already mentioned, the émigrés were overwhelmingly young, and lived through 
years of underemployment, despite their university degrees. When they left Austria, 
they came to realize that they did not fit well into the schemes of those refugee help 
organizations which had been established to resettle well- known scholars abroad. 
5. 
Both the London- and the New York-based refugee help organizations, the Academic 
Assistance Council, later renamed to Society for the Protection of Science and 
Learning, and the Emergency Committee in Aid of Displaced German (later: Foreign) 
Scholars, restricted their financial support to recognized scholars. It is true that both 
organizations and their officers in particular, offered a helping hand to all who 
approached them, but actual grants or any other material help remained restricted to 
prominent figures. To illustrate this I compared both organizations‟ files of individuals 
with the names of the 412 refugees in my sample of sociologists/social scientists. In 
1936 the A.A.C. published a directory of refugee scholars, and added a supplementary 
list one year later.
11
 In both lists I found the names of six Austrian social scientists and 
sixteen scholars who had spent time in both Germany and Austria (double citizens), 
compared with a hundred Germans. The archive of A.A.C. / S.P.S.L. at the Bodleian 
Library, Oxford, contains files for 28 Austrian social scientists and 5 double citizens.
12
 
Only six Austrian or double citizen social scientists actually received financial aid 
                                                          
11 Reprinted in: Strauss, Herbert A., Tilmann Buddensieg & Kurt Düwell (eds.), Emigration. Deutsche Wissenschaftler nach 1933. 
Entlassung und Vertreibung. Berlin: TU Berlin 1987. 
12 I did not search for Germans then. 
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from the S.P.S.L.: Gustav E. Grünebaum, Karl F. Helleiner, Friedrich O. Hertz, Erich 
Hula, Gustav Ichheiser, Marie Jahoda. Grünebaum had been an assistant at the 
University of Vienna, the historian Helleiner was a collaborator of the Monumenta 
Germaniae Historia, the sociologist Hertz and the political scientist Hula both held 
posts in German universities before 1933, but returned to Vienna before finally going 
into exile. The social psychologist Jahoda arrived in London in the summer of 1937 
and the psychologist Ichheiser escaped from Central Europe around the time of the 
Anschluss. As table 5 shows the New York-based Emergency Committee supported 
more Austrian refugees, and even more approached this organization for help but did 
not succeed. Eight Austrians and five double citizens became grantees of the 
Emergency Committee, compared with 26 Germans. Nearly the same number of 
Austrians (and double citizens) as Germans approached the American philanthropists 
but were refused assistance, in most cases because of inadequate academic 
credentials.
13
 The last line in table 3 indicate the lower rate of received financial help 
by one of the refugee help organizations if one relates the numbers to the German help 
seekers. The most astonishing finding is however that a much higher number of 
émigrés did not even approach the A.A.C. or E.C.  
How should one explain these patterns? One part of the story is that the British 
academic system was not much more favourably inclined to the social sciences than its 
Austrian counterparts at this time. Few British universities had social science posts 
even for British citizens, and research units outside the university system were scarce, 
so that migrants may not have considered looking to Great Britain for employment. Of 
the 40 Austrian refugee scholars in all disciplines supported by A.A.C. / S.P.S.L. half 
had left the U.K. for other places, the U.S. in particular, within a year. Those who 
remained in Britain received only modest financial support (see table 6). 
With regard to the social scientists fleeing Austria around the time of Anschluss the 
United Kingdom functioned mostly as a stopover. About twenty former Austrians 
(including double citizens) remained in the U.K., but 190 migrated to the U.S. (in 
many cases without even setting their feet on the British Isles), seven ended up in 
Canada, six remained in Switzerland, and others across the globe. 
Nevertheless the moral support given by the officers of the Society, and especially 
Esther (Tess) Simpson, probably played a crucial role in the decision- making process 
of refugee scholars. Karl Popper, for example, would not have got his post in New 
Zealand without her help.  
All in all, only 83 of the 412 German-speaking émigré social scientists I studied in 
detail received help from any of the organizations or schemes established for refugee 
scholars. The negligible organizational help for the majority of the émigrés from 
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Austria calls for an explanation. How did the 162 Austrian and double citizens who 
did not leave any trace in the files of the New York Committee succeed in resettling 
themselves abroad? 
6. 
The fate of the émigrés was shaped by several factors. Some were rooted in their 
earlier lives; others were socio-structural characteristics beyond their individual 
agency. In trying to understand these, certain features stand out. First of all, one has to 
take into account the age at which someone had to leave. The younger the individual, 
the more easily he or she could hope to begin a new life abroad. The average age of 
the Austrians émigrés was modestly low. Older refugees who had already established 
their reputation experienced more or less serious difficulties in exile. Otto Neurath, 
despite his wide networks as organizer of the neo-positivist movement and 
competences in more than one occupational field lived a very modest life in Oxford. 
Edgar Zilsel who escaped to New York experienced a second spring as a scholarly 
writer – he published more papers in exile in a shorter period of time than in two 
decades in Vienna – but real settlement in the American system was beyond his 
reach.
14
 
A second trait that one could label personal openness may have been similar to age in 
determining the prospects of refugees. What sociologists later on named cosmopolitan 
orientation – an openness towards new experiences, a willingness to learn something 
from new surroundings, a cultural pluralism which accepted values and norms from a 
foreign culture as at least equal – enabled an individual to become the quintessential 
marginal man: someone capable of seeing both sides of a question. The opposite of 
cosmopolitanism is localism. That‟s what émigrés called `beiunsniks’[`by us –niks] – 
people who always compared their new environment with the old, and invariably 
valued the familiar one more highly. A cosmopolitan world view was probably more 
easily adopted by those who had experienced migrancy before, either personally or via 
their parents.  
Closely related to this world view was the role Kultur played for the self-
consciousness of refugees. The overwhelming majority of the exiled German and 
Austrians held classical German literature, music, and the other arts in high esteem. 
The more they valued their European culture, and in particular the more they thought it 
superior to the culture of others, the less they could be open to culturally new and 
different experiences. Yet unless they regarded something in the new cultural 
environment as intrinsically precious they could not assimilate.
15
 Of comparable 
                                                          
14 Some authors relate his suicide in 1944 to his difficulties in finding an appropriate place in the U.S. but it is always very difficult 
to attribute a suicide to a single cause. 
15 Telling examples of the opposite attitudes are Alfred Schütz and Theodor W. Adorno. Very early after his coming to New York 
Schütz wrote to his friend Eric Voegelin that “unser Europäerhochmut (ist) ganz und gar unangebracht” (our European arrogance is 
completely inappropriate) whereas thirty years after his arrival in New York Adorno remembered with disdain his encounters with 
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relevance to the strength of an individual‟s ties to his or her former society and its 
culture was his or her political orientation. It is well known that individuals with 
strong political beliefs experienced of expulsion with less trauma than those who could 
not make sense of what had happened. Political convictions change during lifetime, 
however, and sometimes such a change is followed by a re-interpretation of one‟s 
political past. Very often the history remembered in later years had very little to do 
with the reality. Memories are seldom simply a reflection of the past. Although this 
makes it difficult for those who want to write history or analyze the experiences of 
particular groups of individuals, living through turbulent times may encourage modes 
of reframing and reinterpretation;. For the Jewish refugees of the 1930s and 40s, this 
feature was counterbalanced by the strength of their Jewish identity and national 
identity. Those who had not been observant before the rise of Nazism may have 
continued non-observance after their flight, but if so they had despairingly to accept 
that their stigmatization and victimization had happened without any chance for 
agency. 
The degree of trauma experienced by individuals may have had an influence on their 
acculturation after escape but it is not easy to estimate the strength of this as a causal 
factor. Refugees who experienced persecution personally may have lost all their 
attachment to their former society and culture, and this may also have happened if 
their family or friends had been persecuted or killed in the Holocaust. There are many 
individual memories to support this but we do not have the evidence to generalise this 
to all cases. Often, the impact of the traumatic experience was counterbalanced by 
political conviction. Those who opposed the Nazis on political grounds may have been 
able to come to terms with their personal suffering more easily than those who were 
deeply committed to German culture; those without political understanding may have 
experienced the terror more severely than the politically informed. If we consider 
further that traumatizing experiences change their meaning over time, we must 
conclude that while trauma played a role we cannot generalise from this in a 
comparative group analysis because we lack the data needed. Personal degradation and 
the victimization of people close to one may be connected to other, more readily 
analyzable life experiences. The loss of a job, differences in income between former 
occupations and in exile are more readily observable by a historical sociologist than 
changes in psychology. 
As early as 1947 a group of researchers conducted a survey on the assimilation of the 
immigrants in the U.S.
16
 The “Committee for the Study of Recent Immigration from 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
the American mass culture and conformist academics; see: Alfred Schütz and Eric Voegelin, Eine Freundschaft, die ein Leben 
ausgehalten hat. Briefwechsel 1938-1959, Konstanz: UVK 2004, 58 (letter dated from 23 November 1939) and Theodor W. Adorno, 
Wissenschaftliche Erfahrungen in Amerika, reprinted in: Geschichte der Soziologie. Studien zur kognitiven, sozialen und historischen Identität 
einer Disziplin, ed. Wolf Lepenies, Vol. 1, Frankfurt: Suhrkamp 1981, 299-336 (originally 1969).  
16 Davie, Maurice R., Refugees in America. Report of the Committee for the Study of Recent Immigration from Europe, New York, London: 
Harper & Brothers 1947. 
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Europe” worked closely with the follow-up group of the U.S. Emergency Committee 
and the published results deserve serious consideration. Their findings about social 
mobility are astonishing: only 0.8 per cent of the refugees experienced downward 
mobility, but 36 per cent were reported to be better off in the U.S. than back in Europe 
(63 per cent reported no occupational changes at all). 67 per cent of male refugee 
scholars from professional backgrounds of and 52 of the female from the same 
occupational strata remained in the same occupational category after coming to the 
U.S.  
A more recent survey of the so-called second-wave generation (i.e. individuals who 
came to the U.S. as children or young adults) reported very similar results. Whereas 
the 1947 survey investigated the whole refugee population the second focused on the 
elite refugees, those who made their way up into Who’s Who and American Men and 
Women of Science.
17
 Looked at from the receiving end one has to mention the fact that 
the United States has always been an immigrant society and finding a place in it 
depended mostly on individual‟s effort to assimilate. Table 7 tries to offer a scheme 
for analyzing the characteristics which may have contributed to this adaptation. One 
should be able to locate each individual in the “property space”, at least in principle. 
For simplification I decided to classify each dimension in three ways-: Assimilation is 
highly probable if one is located in the far right column and it is least probable if one 
ends up in the right one. Unfortunately lack of data for many of the refugee scholars 
stopped my analysis before entering the more interesting stage of building a typology 
that would have offered an opportunity to compare the differing sub-groups of 
sociologists or social scientists further. 
Even without such a typology, however, it is possible to conclude that, within the 
larger group of German- speaking refugee scholars, the Austrians who finally became 
sociologists had characteristics that enabled them to succeed after incomparable 
traumatic experiences. Help from natives in the U.K. and in the U.S. played no minor 
role but the astonishing achievement stems from the émigrés themselves. 
  
                                                          
17 Gerhard Sonnert and Gerald Holton, What Happened to the Children Who Fled Nazi Persecution, New York: Palgrave Macmillan 
2006. 
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Table 1: Educated classes in Germany, approximate number of victims of the Nazi purge 
Profession overall number percentage of victims 
High School Teachers 37 500  
Protestant Clergymen 37 000  
Doctors 35 000 16% 
Higher Civil Servants and Judges 28 000   7% 
Lawyers 19 000 21% 
University Professors 12 000 25% 
Journalists, Writers, Artists   8 000  
Totale 175 500  
 
or approx. 0,3% of the 
population 
 
Source: Wehler 2003, 726f. 
 
Table 2: Change in professional groups in Austria 1934 to 1939 
Profession 1934 1939 Difference 
Doctors   7 368 6 244 -15% 
Lawyers, solicitors   5 890 2 263 -61% 
Writers, Journalists, etc.   3 103 1 457 -53% 
Totale 16 361   
 
or approx. about 0,2% of the 
population 
 
Source: Fleck 2004, 235-7. 
 
Table 3: Ratio between Austria and Germany* 
For every 100 Germans account for ... Austrians 
Population (1930’s) 10 
Universities (1930’s) 13 
Students (1930’s) 15 
Teaching staff (1930’s) 30 
Dismissed Professors (1933 and 1938, resp.) 34 
Grantees of Emergency Committee (1933 – 1944) 20 
 
Sources: Population: Brian R. Mitchell, International historical statistics: Europe, 1750-1988, New York: 
Stockton Press, 1992;  
Universities, students and teaching staff: Hartmut Titze (ed.), Handbuch der deutschen Bildungsgeschichte, 
Bd. 1 Hochschulen, Teil 1, Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht 1987;  
Dismissed professors: for Germany: A Crisis in the University World, published by the Office of the 
High Commissioner for Refugees (Jewish and others) coming from Germany, March 1935, p. 5, for 
Austria: Society for the Protection of Science and Learning, formerly Academic Assistance Council, 
Fourth Report, London, November, 1938, p. 5; 
Grantees of the Emergency Committee: Stephen Duggan and Betty Drury, The Rescue of Science and 
Learning. The Story of the Emergency Committee in Aid of Displaced Foreign Scholars, New York: Macmillan 
1948, appendix iii, p. 195. 
 
Table 4: Dismissals of Professors in Austria 1938 and Germany after 1933 (approximation, in per cent of 
each status group) 
Status Vienna Graz Innsbruck 
Austria, 
totale 
Germany 
professor)      o. Prof. (full 
professor) 
37 30 22 ~42 28 
ao. Prof. (associate 
professor) 
 25 26   
Dozent 49 13 13 37 37 
Others   28  54 
All faculty 45 23 19   
N 322 33 32 387 1500 
Published 
approximations for all 
faculty 
   ~ 37 - 66 20 - 39 
Source: my calculation according to: for Vienna Mühlberger (1990); for Graz: Fleck (1985), and for 
Innsbruck: Oberkofler (1981) 
 
Table 5: Comparison of the book-keeping of refugee social scientists in London and New York 
S.P.S.L. Emergency Committee 
 Austrians Germans 
Double 
Citizens 
 Austrians Germans 
Double 
Citizens 
        
List 1936 8 98 16 Grantees 8 26 5 
List 1937 0 5 0 Contact 22 49 20 
Files 28 ? 5 None 188 291 49 
 
 
Table 6: Amount and length of financial support for Austrian S.P.S.L. grantees (all disciplines) compared 
with their residency 
 Remained in U.K. Left U.K. 
 ≤ ₤182 > ₤182 ≤ ₤182 > ₤182 
≤ 1 year   4 0 8 9 
> 1 year 12 4 1 1 
 
 
Table 7: Dimensions influencing the adaptation of refugee scholars towards new environments 
DIMENSION: 
AND OPERATIONALIZATION 
PROPERTY SPACE 
Age old (> 40) middle (26 – 
39) 
young (< 25) 
Openness: as a personality trait local  cosmopolitan 
Previous migration experience: e.g. leaving 
Eastern parts of empire 
none parents oneself 
Role of Kultur deeply rooted  dismissing 
Degradation experience, Trauma prisoner, camp 
survivor 
 “voluntary” 
exiled 
Victimization: loss of relatives high  lower 
Jewish identity 
 
achieved after 
migration 
Jewish 
community 
irreligious 
Political orientation exile  break with one’s 
past 
National self: Near the end of one’s life German German + X X (as e.g. 
American) 
Use of German language after emigration regularly privately never 
Acculturation: enclave vs. assimilation living in the “Fourth 
Reich” 
 marriage with a 
native person 
Occupation before migration culturally bounded  none, e.g. 
students 
Income before migration high medium low 
Occupational status after emigration downward mobile static upward mobile 
 
